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This paper seeks to provide a political explanation for the unexpectedly high levels of 
inequality found in the African region today.  There is much variation within the region, 
however the common history and structural factors suggests a distinctly African kind of 
inequality. The paper describes the recent literature on African inequality and examines 
the limitations of traditional explanations for inequality in Africa. Instead, it is argued 
that natural endowments in the region shaped the nature of colonial institutions, which in 
turn created the conditions for high levels of inequality. The author concludes that the 
surprisingly high levels of inequality in Africa can be understood as part and parcel of a 
process of class formation linked to processes of state building that have their origins in 
the economic institutions of the early colonial state. Colonialism favored, in relative 
terms, certain indigenous groups, which often inherited the state at independence.  Insofar 
as political power has often been used to gain economic advantages during the post-
colonial era, inequality has changed little over the course of the last forty years, despite 
the official focus on development and poverty alleviation by donors and governments 
alike.   
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The Institutional Origins of Inequality in Sub-Saharan Africa1 
 
Introduction: The Puzzle of Socio-Economic inequality in Sub-Saharan Africa 
 
For a long time, a stylized fact among economists held that sub-Saharan Africa possessed 
the lowest levels of interpersonal inequality among the less-developed regions of the 
world.  In the absence of reliable comparative distribution data, this view was buttressed 
by economists’ understanding of the main structural causes of inequality in developing 
countries.  A primary cause of social inequality was viewed as the distribution of major 
economic assets, particularly access to land rights.  In fact, most of sub-Saharan Africa 
does not have the highly skewed patterns of land distribution characteristic of the Latin 
American latifundia, and the problem of landlessness, an overwhelming source of 
desperate poverty in South Asia, was said to be virtually absent in Africa, thanks to 
historically low population densities.  Southern Africa offers significant exceptions to this 
stylized fact, of course, and so economists expected South Africa or Zimbabwe, for 
instance, to have high levels of inequality – but not the rest of Africa.  
 
Second, the influential Kuznets Hypothesis, (Kuznets, 1955) according to which 
inequality rises during the process of industrialization before declining again, following 
an  inverted U  pattern, suggested that low-income SSA would have lower levels of 
inequality than middle income Latin America, for example, which was further along in 
the process of economic structural transformation (for instance, Fallers, 1964)  Even as 
mounting empirical evidence started to weaken the credibility of the Kuznets Hypothesis, 
most observers still held onto the logic that inequality was less likely in economies in 
which there had been relatively little capitalist accumulation (for instance, Hyden, 1983, 
p. 22).  By this argument, as well, the poorest, least industrialized countries in Africa 
were expected to have low levels of inequality, while middle income South Africa was 
expected to have higher levels of inequality. 
                                                 
1 Though the usual disclaimers apply, the author thanks Leslie Elliot Armijo, Cathy Boone,  John 
Echeverri-Gent, Gero Erdmann, John Gerring, Jonathan Krieckhaus and Daniele Resnick for their helpful 
comments on an earlier draft. 
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As more income distribution data on African economies has finally become available in 
the course of the last two decades, the relatively high levels of inequality through out sub-
Saharan Africa has provided a major surprise.  As shown in Table 1, the comparative 
numbers suggest average inequality levels in Africa to be broadly comparable to those in 
Latin America and considerably higher than those in Asia. 
 
Table 1: Inequality in Africa, Asia and Latin America (around 1998) 
 
   Africa Asia Latin America 
Inequality     
      
Average Country Gini 47.1 35.6 50.5 
Gini standard deviation 7.9 7.7 6.2 
      
Minimum Gini  38 23 39 
   (Madagascar) (Japan) (Barbados) 
      
Maximum Gini  66 54 60 
   (Lesotho) 
(Papua New 
Guinea) (Columbia) 
      
      
Source: Milanovic, 2003.    
 
 
A number of economic studies have sought to explain this somewhat unexpected result 
(Milanovic, 2003; Okojie and Shimeles, 2006; Moradi and Baten, 2005).  Finding that it 
is not easily explained by the standard economic correlates of income distribution, they 
have typically alluded to the importance of political factors and political economy 
dynamics to explain Africa’s higher than expected levels of inequality, but without much 
investigation.  Milanovic (2003), for instance, suggests that high levels of inequality can 
be associated with Africa’s high levels of ethnic heterogeneity, but argues the causal 
mechanisms that lead from ethnic heterogeneity to inequality are unclear.  
 
Curiously, for its part, the recent political science literature on domestic inequality in the 
developing world is sparse, and on sub-Saharan Africa, it is virtually non-existent.  
Political scientists have been considerably more interested in explaining the global 
inequality across nations, but have devoted negligible attention to domestic inequality.  
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Inequality is sometimes utilized to as an explanatory variable in studies of conflict or 
political instability, but rarely as a variable to be explained.  The recent report of 
American Political Science Task Force on Difference, Inequality and Developing 
Societies (2007) provides a good example; the half of the report that is on domestic 
inequality rather than global inequality concerns mostly the consequences of inequality 
for economic growth and political stability. The report is actually fairly vague regarding 
the causes of inequality in the developing world, and very little of the data concerns low-
income Africa.   
 
A better understanding of Africa’s surprisingly high inequality is important.  As just 
suggested, inequality is widely viewed as having a negative long term effect on the 
prospects for political stability.  Understanding the causes of inequality, thus, is a first 
step towards understanding and preventing political instability.  In addition, and no doubt 
not coincidentally, an emerging literature has established that inequality has negative 
consequences for economic growth and poverty alleviation (Alesina and Rodrik, 1994; 
Perotti, 1996; Persson and Tabellini, 1992; and Nel, 2003 on Africa).  Scholars also agree 
that democracy is less likely to flower in highly unequal societies (eg, Boix, 2003).   
 
In sum, this paper seeks to provide a political explanation for unexpectedly high levels of 
inequality found in the Africa region today.  I focus on the factors shared by the 48 
different countries in the region, though I also sketch out some tentative hypotheses on 
the factors that account for differences across the countries.  As will become evident, 
there is much variation within the region, but at the same time, the common history and 
structural factors make it tempting to try to identify a distinctly African kind of 
inequality. 
 
The paper’s next section describes the recent literature on inequality in the region.  A 
certain number of stylized facts about the region are established, even if significant gaps 
in the availability of distribution data preclude unambiguous conclusions about the 
longitudinal trends, though these are asserted in the literature not infrequently.  A third 
section examines three traditional explanations for inequality in Africa and finds their 
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explanatory power limited.  A fourth section then turns to the structuring impact of 
colonial rule on income distribution.  It is argued that natural endowments in the region 
shaped the nature of colonial institutions, which in turn created the conditions for high 
levels of inequality.  A fifth section extends the argument to the post-colonial period and 
suggests that inequality should be understood as a side product of a process of elite 
formation in the states of the region.  The section comes to grip with the persistence of 
inequality following independence. Most of the paper focuses on modal patterns in the 
continent, but a sixth section examines the possible causes of the inter-country variation 
in inequality that is observed. A final section concludes. 
  
The Characteristics of Contemporary Inequality 
 
The low quality and dearth of distribution data for Africa enormously complicates the 
task of this paper.  Over the course of the last two decades an increasing number of 
household and individual surveys of consumption, income or expenditures have been 
undertaken in Africa that allow us to estimate the level of inequality in the region.  
Nonetheless, the different methodologies used and data quality issues seriously limits the 
degree of comparability across time and country.  Cross national comparisons typically 
involve a small number of data points for no more than two dozen of sub-Saharan 
Africa’s 48 countries.  Nor are coverage gaps random: fewer studies get done in the 
poorer and less politically stable countries, which may well have characteristics that 
correlate with income distribution dynamics.  Different surveys vary in the unit of 
analysis (individuals or households), the sample (total population, population in the 
primate city, population of a specific region or province and so on), and the focus of the 
distribution (income, consumption, expenditures).  These differences result in sometimes 
sharply different distribution data, but are not clearly comparable across countries.   
 
These same problems cloud the issue of longitudinal trends.  The first attempt to collect 
systematic inequality data from the developing world is reported in Deininger and Squire 
(1996 and 1998), and they argued only 8 national data points of acceptable quality exist 
before 1980 for the 48 countries in sub-Saharan Africa.  The current comprehensive 
UNU-WIDER data base on inequality lists a total of 36 surveys for 16 countries (see 
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Table 3, below) between 1945 and 1965, but none of the surveys receives UNU-
WIDER’s top rating for quality, and only a single one (Madagascar, in 1962) gets the 
second highest rating.  Thus, and though the quality of the surveys appears to have 
improved over time, one must be exceedingly careful about conclusions regarding 
longitudinal trends in individual countries.  
 
With these caveats in mind, Table 2 provides the available Gini coefficients for African 
countries between 1995 and 2004.  Gini coefficients are widely viewed as the best single 
overall measure of inequality.  While there are other measures with merit (Fields, 2001; 
Milanovic, 2005), the broad availability and general recognition of the Gini leads this 
paper to adopt it as the main measure of inequality.  Table 2 provide both an estimated 
Gini coefficient from the latest available surveys with a quality rating2, as well as an 
average of different estimated Gini coefficients from different surveys during this period.  
When there was only one survey during the period, the same Gini is reported in both 
columns.  While the differences between the columns provide some pause, these numbers 












                                                 
2  WIDER (2007) provides a data quality rating with 1 as the highest quality and 4 the lowest quality.  
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Average of Surveys, 
Survey            1990 - 2005 
Country Year Gini Quality Gini # of surveys 
      
Benin 2003 36.5 3 36.5 1 
Botswana 1994 53.7 2 48.5 4 
Burkina Faso 2003 39.5 3 56.9 8 
Burundi 1998 41.8 3 37.6 2 
Cameroon 1996 50.8 1 51.5 3 
Central African 
Republic 1992 61.4 3 60.4 3 
Cote d`Ivoire 2002 44.5 3 41.2 5 
Djibouti 2002 40.9 3 42.5 3 
Ethiopia 1995 52.7 2 42.6 7 
Gabon 1994 44.1 3 44.1 1 
Gambia 1998 47.1 3 57.4 9 
Ghana 1999 40.7 3 40.3 7 
Guinea 1994 55.1 2 49.0 6 
Guinea-Bissau 1994 44.3 3 50.0 2 
Kenya 1999 62.5 3 61.1 6 
Lesotho 1999 60.0 3 52.7 6 
Madagascar 1993 48.5 1 48.1 6 
Malawi 2004 39.0 3 50.1 3 
Mali 2001 40.1 3 55.3 4 
Mauritania 2000 39.0 3 45.8 4 
Mauritius 2001 37.1 2 37.7 4 
Mozambique 2002 47.3 3 43.4 2 
Namibia 1993 73.9 3 73.9 1 
Niger 1995 50.6 3 46.2 3 
Nigeria 2003 43.7 3 59.4 7 
Rwanda 2000 45.4 3 45.4 1 
Senegal 2001 41.3 3 49.1 6 
Sierra Leone 2003 39.0 3 39.0 1 
South Africa 2000 56.5 3 44.6 5 
Swaziland 2001 50.4 3 54.8 2 
Tanzania 2001 36.7 2 41.4 6 
Uganda 2002 45.7 3 50.0 9 
Zambia 2004 50.8 3 49.3 14 
Zimbabwe 1995 73.1 3 67.7 3 
      








The estimated Gini coefficients provide a first glance at income inequality in the region. 
The least one can say is that there appears to be remarkable variation.  Gini coefficients 
above .6 are generally viewed as exhibiting extreme levels of inequality.  Yet five 
countries are at this level or close to it (Lesotho, CAR, Kenya, Zimbabwe and Namibia). 
At the other extreme, 5 countries are below .4, which puts them below average for all 
developing countries.  
 
How have these data evolved over time?  The data reported in UNU-WIDER includes 
data on 16 countries from the late 1950s and early 1960s.  The average Gini coefficient 
reported for these countries is .49, so very similar to the average for the present period 
reported in Table 2.   The economics literature similarly does not suggest a strong trend 
over time.  Deininger and Squire (1998) suggest that average inequality levels in Africa 
declined between the 1960s and the 1990s.   For his part, and with more recent data, 
Milanovic (2003) agrees that inequality declined in the immediate post-independence 
years, but suggests that it has been increasing since the early 1990s.  Artadi and Sala-i-
Martin (2003) report a steady increase in inequality for Africa through out the post-
independence period.   In fact, it is hardly clear there is a single regional trend over time. 
The latest version of the World Bank’s POVCALNET data, which provides perhaps the 
most comparable data set of cross national income inequality (reported in Ferreira and 
Ravallion, 2008), reports multiple data points for 28 of the 48 countries in the region; the 
Gini coefficients they report appear to be increasing in 6 countries, decreasing in 11, and 
no clear trend is apparent in 11.  One problem with characterizing the evolution of 
inequality over the last thirty years is the existence of multiple data points for only a 
handful of countries. The POVCALNET reports more than 3 Gini coefficients for only 11 
countries.  For his part, Milanovic bases his conclusion about regional trends from a 
comparison of 10 observations in the 1960s, 3 in the 1970s, 13 in the 1980s, and with 42 
observations in the 1990s.  Since data availability is unlikely to be random, but rather 
correlated with salient factors such as the number of settlers in the country, the level of 
GNP, the level of intra-state conflict, or the national concern with policy issues relating to 
inequality, conclusions about longitudinal trends seem largely hypothetical.   
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What are the other characteristics of the inequality that is observed?  A large literature 
suggests that overall inequality is both caused by and related to certain characteristic 
social patterns in the region.  Thus, Sahn and Stifel (2003) find very sharp inequalities in 
asset holdings, particularly in the country side.  Access to social services such as 
education and health services is often highly unequal through out the region, with 
significant urban/rural, gender and regional disparities (Okojie and Shimeles, 2006 for a 
good literature review).  These different disparities often compound each other; thus, 
gender imbalances in education or health appear to be more glaring in poorer regions and 
isolated rural areas (for instance Christiaensen et al, 2003).  Indeed, observers have 
remarked upon the striking nature of spatial inequality in the sub continent, with large 
differences in income across regions within the same countries, and substantial rural-
urban differences.  A first stylized fact is that a rich coastal region is in stark contrast to a 
much poorer hinterland, a phenomenon that is particularly evident in West Africa.  A 
second stylized fact has it that distance from the capital city is positively correlated with 
poverty (Christiaensen et al, 2003). 
 
Traditional Explanations for Inequality 
This section reviews a number of standard explanations for income inequality in the 
developing world.  
 
The Inverted U hypothesis: First, a Kuznets like dynamic, in which inequality would be 
related to the level of economic development, finds little empirical support in the data, a 
finding already reported in Milanovic (2003).  Figure 1 graphs inequality numbers on 
GNP per capita, and reveals no discernable bivariate relationship.  To be sure, some of 
Africa’s middle income countries (eg Botswana) have relatively high levels of inequality.  
However, some of the region’s poorest countries (such as CAR), also do.  There are some 
dynamics that are compatible with a Kuznets effect in individual countries, notably in the 
spatial inequality just described in the previous section.  However, they do not appear to 




Figure 1: Inequality and Development Level 
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Land Asset Inequality:  Second, the relationship between the distribution of land assets 
and income inequality, the other traditional explanation for the level of inequality in 
developing countries, is tougher to establish for Africa.  It has long been established that 
settler colonies like South Africa or Zimbabwe promoted sharp rural inequality, which 
resulted in a very small minority of Europeans owning hugely disproportionate shares of 
the arable land.  In South Africa, for instance, whites made up about 5% of the 
population, yet owned 87% of the land (Manji, 2001. p. 330). There is thus every reason 
to believe that the observed inequality in a handful of countries is related to the 
substantial community of settler farms there before independence.  Such countries would 
include Kenya, in addition to countries in southern Africa such as Namibia, South Africa, 
and Zimbabwe.  I return to the issue of the impact of colonialism on inequality below.   
 
On the other hand, there is no comparative data for land ownership inequality, outside of 
the settler economies of southern Africa.  Historically, the view was that tropical Africa 
was land-abundant and that labor was the major production constraint (Hayami and 
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Platteau, 1997).  Nonetheless, struggles over land have clearly intensified in recent years 
as population pressures and ecological decline have increased (Peters, 2004; Manji, 
2001).  The increasingly pervasive struggles over land rights, even in regions in which 
low population pressures had historically resulted in fairly wide access to arable land, has 
been much remarked upon.  There is, however, no good indicator of this phenomena for 
the region as a whole, to test for a relationship with inequality.  Figure 2 does graph our 
Gini coefficients against hectares of arable land per capita, data collected by the FAO.  It 
is obviously a very inadequate measure of land asset distribution.  What constitutes arable 
land is notably slippery, particularly in marginal areas.  But at the very least, it might be 
thought that unequal access to land might be exacerbated by higher population pressures 
on land.  Interestingly, however, figure 2 reveals a somewhat counter-intuitive significant 
positive bivariate relationship between inequality and per capita land; the more land per 
capita, the higher the level of inequality.  The literature has found a similar result for 
Latin America, a point to which I return below. 
 
Figure 2:  Arable Land and inequality 
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Globalization: A third standard explanation for both high levels of inequality in the 
developing world and for increasing levels of inequality is the nature of the region’s 
insertion into the global economy.  A substantial literature has long argued the global 
economic factors cause both economic stagnation and inequality in developing countries 
(American Political Science Association, 2007).  It should be noted that these two effects 
of the global economy need not go together.  Global capitalism could cause stagnation, 
but promote equality, or vice versa.  In this paper, I do not address its impact on growth, 
but only on inequality.  The causal mechanism for such a link is not clear. The traditional 
economics argument provides that foreign direct investment and global trade dynamics 
increases wages in the receiving low-income economy, as shown by the venerable 
Stolper-Samuelson theorem, since the latter predicts that the relatively abundant factor of 
production (low wage labor) benefits from trade openness (but see Davis and Mishra, 
2007).  This is the logic that leads some observers to argue that the forces of globalization 
are increasing inequality within the industrialized countries by pushing down wages (for 
discussions, see Firebaugh, 2003; Krugman and Lawrence, 1993).  Since Africa has a 
comparative advantage in low wage labor relative to the developing countries, one would 
expect investments to benefit low wage laborers and increase their purchasing power, 
thus improving the distribution of income.   
 
In any event, since Africa has received very little foreign direct investment over the 
course of the last thirty years outside of the oil industry in a handful of countries, the 
generally high levels of inequality observed in the region can not generally be explained 
by the usual globalization theories.  Even in the case of oil producers, the standard 
argument has to be refashioned:  the argument for a link between foreign investment and 
inequality is usually that salaries in the open part of the economy are lower than average, 
not higher, as is typically the case with salaries high value, capital intensive oil sector.    
 
A slightly different argument advanced among others by Wibbels (2006) and Rudra 
(2003) holds that globalization spurs a competitive race to the bottom, in which 
developing countries withdraw social expenditures and welfare provisions in order to 
promote competitiveness and attract foreign capital.  It might be noted that others, 
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notably Rodrik (1999) have argued the contrary position that competitiveness implies the 
need for more proactive governments in order to promote labor productivity.  For his 
part, Moran (2002) argues that foreign firms in developing countries tend to provide 
higher salaries and benefits than local companies.  Regardless, it is difficult to settle the 
matter without more data on Africa.  Unfortunately, Wibbels and Rudra use data on 
behalf of their argument that mostly includes middle income and non-African cases. On 
the other hand, Rodrik (1999) offers econometric support for his view that globalization 
is compatible with equality, as does Anderson and McKay (2004), with African data.  
The evidence also tends to suggest that low-income export oriented economies have done 
well on poverty reduction, though there are significant issues of reverse causality in such 
studies (Harrison, 2007).   
 
In sum, the case for growing international economic integration having a negative causal 
effect on income distribution in Africa is far from clear, at least within the current data 
limitations.  Moreover, the recent literature suggests that links between growth and 
inequality are themselves mediated by other, prior, factors.  For instance, there is some 
evidence that in highly unequal countries, growth generates less poverty reduction than in 
countries with less inequality (Ferreira and Ravallion, 2008), and the reasons are political 
and institutional in nature (Alesina and Rodrik, 1994).  To start to identify these prior 
factors, I turn to history, and in particular, the impact of colonial institutions. 
 
The Structuring Impact of Colonialism 
So much for standard economic arguments.  A fourth standard argument moves us to the 
realm of political economy, and concerns the impact of colonialism on sub-Saharan 
Africa.  It provides a useful starting point from which I will build my own, institutionalist 
argument.   An influential recent literature (Among others Engerman and Sokoloff, 2000; 
Acemoglu and Robinson, 2001; Hoff, 2003) has argued that natural endowments and the 
resulting colonial institutions had a powerful structuring effect on the political economies 
of new world countries.  Contrasting North and Latin America, Engerman and Sokoloff 
(2000) argue that labor scarcities and the economies of scale of the plantation agriculture 
for which tropical Latin America and the Caribbean were suited resulted in a slave 
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economy with substantial income and social inequalities, and the control of the state by a 
land holding oligarchy. Over time, the legacy of these initial endowments was to be a set 
of political economy institutions which sustained high levels of inequality and slow 
growth.  In contrast, factor endowments and geography resulted in much more egalitarian 
small holder settler economies in North America that would eventually promote 
democratic and more responsive government, even if they initially appeared poorer and 
endowed with less economic potential3.  This literature argues that inequality today can 
be traced back to these initial conditions and their impact on colonial and post-colonial 
institutions. 
 
How well does such a thesis travel to Africa?   For now, I look at modal patterns across 
the sub-Saharan Africa region. In section 6 below, I address the issue of variation within 
the region and tackle issues relating to the specific nature of settler colonies in southern 
Africa.  Particularly in tropical Africa, early colonialism in the second half of the 19th 
century was also shaped by profound labor scarcities, given the devastation brought on by 
the earlier slave trade, historically low population densities in the forest areas, and 
endemic diseases that precluded large scale immigration.  Much of west and central 
Africa is also well-suited for crops such as palm oil or sugar, for which there are 
substantial economies of scale, and which thus lend themselves to plantation style 
agriculture.   
 
Thus, at least superficially, the initial conditions facing colonists in much of tropical 
Africa resemble those in Latin America.  The differences between colonialism in the 
Americas and Africa, moreover, are probably even more important to the specific 
dynamics of stratification observed in Africa.   First and foremost, is the question of 
duration.  The colonial era in the Americas lasted roughly three hundred years, from 
1500 to the early part of the 19th century, ending decades before the Berlin conference of 
1884 partitioned Africa among the European powers and signaled the ‘scramble’ for the 
region.  The several centuries of European control of the Americas created domestic 
                                                 
3 Voltaire is famously said to have referred to Canada as  a few acres of snow ,  reflecting the prevailing 
18th century view of that colony’s limited economic potential. 
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institutional and state traditions that became over time in some sense indigenous to the 
colony and to colonial society, even when the proportion of the population that was of 
European descent was a distinct minority.   In Africa, on the other hand, the very brief 
period of colonialism – roughly a six to eight decade interlude between the end of the 19th 
century and the decades immediately following World War II -- was such that the 
colonial state was always a foreign creation, superimposed and separate from the local 
society and its customs with whom it was deeply illegitimate (Abernethy, 2000; Young, 
1994).   
 
Critically, Africa presented the colonial powers the same labor conundrums as in Latin 
America.  Of course, European colonization of Africa occurred mostly well after slavery 
had been formally abolished in the West (in 1833 for the British Empire, and 1848 in 
France’s holdings), and the prevailing international norms prevented the wholesale 
adoption of slavery to palliate the labor shortages.  Nonetheless, slavery remained a 
common practice in Africa, not only in the Western economic sectors being structured 
after the middle of the 19th century, but also in indigenous economic systems further 
inland.  For instance, it is estimated that perhaps as many as half the population were in a 
state of enslavement in the Muslim states of West Africa (Hopkins, 1973, p. 226; see also 
Suret-Canale, 1971, pp. 60-67).  In any event,  the colonial powers used various forms of 
forced labor when they could, and forced labor practices were only outlawed in 
Francophone Africa, in 1946 (Hopkins, 1973, p. 219).  Throughout, the low population 
densities, notably in much of the continent’s hinterlands proved to be a major constraint 
on the economic ambitions of most of the colonial administrators.  
 
Second, with several significant exceptions, European attitudes to their African colonies 
were shaped by the perception that the latter enjoyed relatively little economic potential.  
Whereas the earlier colonial episodes in the Americas and Asia had been motivated by 
the perception of great mineral wealth and the exploitation of high value agricultural 
crops like sugar, with the exception of southern Africa, the colonization of Africa was 
delayed for so long precisely because the region was viewed as poor and inhospitable.  
This view continued to prevail until after World War II, again with the important 
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exception of mineral rich southern Africa.  It might be noted in this respect that West 
African oil riches were mostly discovered at the end of the colonial era, or after 
independence (Clarke, 2008).  The central colonial debate in Europe in the first half of 
the twentieth century concerned how to benefit from the African colonies, which were 
often viewed as a costly and unprofitable servitude for the metropole (eg Marseilles, 
1984; Cain and Hopkins, 2001, pp. 565-92; Coquery-Vidrovitch, 1969).  As late as World 
War II, most European governments had established the general guideline that African 
colonies self finance all their operations and not represent a fiscal burden for 
metropolitan tax payers.   
 
A third major difference between the Americas and Africa relates to the pacification of 
the colonized regions. Colonization in the Americas was facilitated by the vulnerability 
of indigenous populations to endemic European diseases, which literally devastated local 
populations and allowed exceedingly small groups of Europeans to assert themselves 
militarily on what had been relatively well-structured and powerful local states.  In 
Africa, on the other hand, there was no such vulnerability and pacification of the 
continent led to a series of protracted and difficult military conflicts lasting from the 
second half of the 19th century well into the twentieth century, in other words a 
substantial proportion of the total period of colonialism in the region (Gann and Duignan, 
1969).  Even after this initial pacification, there are a number of cases of forceful 
suppression of indigenous uprisings, right up to independence.  In other words, coercion 
was a significantly more important component of European colonialism in Africa. 
 
Several consequences can be enumerated from this state of affairs that are important to 
patterns of contemporary inequality.  First, the European colonial presence across Africa 
was exceedingly thin.  Outside of southern Africa, only Kenya could claim a non-African 
population in six figures at independence.  Colonial state structures were small:  Kirk-
Greene (1980, p. 39) estimates at 7,666 the total number of British officials in its African 
colonies in 1939, including military and police officers.  He cites the number of 4,547 
French personnel for all of French Colonial Africa in 1950 (p. 38).  European settlers, 
broadly defined as permanent groups of non-Africans who did not work for the 
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administration, were rarely more numerous.  Etemad (2007,  p. 191) estimates the entire 
European population of sub-Saharan Africa (excluding South Africa, but including the 
settler colonies of Portuguese Africa) in 1938 at 550,000, equivalent to 0.4% of the 
continent’s total population.  The Belgian Congo, the biggest colony in the center of the 
continent, for instance, included only 24,000 Europeans in 1938 (Etemad, 2007, p. 177), 
the overwhelming majority of which lived in the colonial capital, Leopoldville, or the 
mining enclave of Katanga.  By way of comparison, Brazil had 390,000 Europeans as 
early as 1760 (Etamad, p. 21), and by the early twentieth century the least Europeanized 
Latin American countries could still count on half the population being at least mestizo, 
the result of several centuries of contact between indigenous and settler populations.  
 
The colonial powers palliated for their weak administrative presence in different ways.  
Most strikingly, much of the territory was allowed to remain under the rule of local 
chiefs, who were designated as auxiliaries of the colonial state and charged with 
collecting a head tax, or implementing the corvée, under which peasants were forced to 
provide free labor, typically to build rural infrastructure.  Different forms of what came to 
be called ‘indirect rule’ were more likely in rural regions with sparse population and 
fewer resources (Boone, 2003; Mamdani, 1996).  To be sure, this account simplifies and 
glosses over significant differences in the dimensions of colonial power and its 
projection.  My main point is that large parts of the continent were barely controlled by 
colonial authorities, let alone administered or developed in any meaningful sense (Herbst, 
2002). 
 
Second, given their need to avoid fiscal imbalances and pay their way from local 
resources, colonial administrations in much of Africa were in effect in low-level 
equilibrium traps, not least because the region’s infrastructural needs were great, and 
without a basic infrastructural grid, much of the continent presented few opportunities for 
capitalist expansion.  Thus, colonial states became openly extractive, but on the whole 
remained modest affairs, without great ambition (eg, on Nigeria, Kohli, 2004), at least 
until the developmental burst that emerged after World War II, when the inevitability of 
independence became obvious.  The local economy could simply not sustain 
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development ambitions, at least without significant external funding which was not 
forthcoming, as neither European tax payers, nor private investors were much interested 
in the region (eg Cain and Hopkins, 2001, for British Africa).   
 
Until a late flurry of activity in the decade before independence, the colonial state 
accomplished remarkably little development in its brief existence. With the exceptions of 
southern Africa, particularly after large amounts of diamonds and gold were discovered 
in South Africa, and several mining enclaves such as the Copper belt in Zambia and the 
Belgian Congo, the development of infrastructure was miniscule and overwhelmingly 
favored coastal areas, where colonial powers typically built their administrative centers.  
A single railroad line might be built from the coast to the hinterland and a modern harbor 
built in the biggest city, but otherwise, colonial investments in infrastructure were few. 
Thus, Fieldhouse (1986) estimates total British and French colonial rail track to be about 
18,000 kilometers (excluding South Africa), a ludicrously small amount, given the size of 
the continent, while total per capita energy production in sub-Saharan Africa to be one 
tenth of the level of that of other low income countries in 1960.   
 
Under a policy of tax farming, colonial authorities encouraged cash crop agriculture, 
largely in order to finance the state rather than to promote economic development.  
Coffee, cotton, cocoa, sisal, palm oil and other crops were encouraged.  Because of the 
small number of European settlers, few large scale plantations actually existed, and 
colonial administration came to advocate small-holder schemes in which the state 
controlled marketing operations for crops farmed by Africans on small family farms with 
little input use (Hart, 1979). In contrast to colonial Latin America, thus, the colonial 
authorities in Africa did consistently promote small holder agriculture.  However, this 
promotion did not include the intensification of cultivation, with the benefits of improved 
infrastructure, agricultural extension or improved inputs, all of which would have 
substantially higher spending levels. As a result at independence, agricultural 
productivity in Africa lagged prevailing levels in other regions (Fieldhouse, 1986).  
Similarly, fiscal ambition shaped the development of many of these crops, which were 
more likely to be aggressively pursued close to a coastline, capital city or navigable river.  
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Thus, in West Africa, much cotton cultivation was designed for hinterland areas near the 
navigable Benue and Niger rivers, while cocoa in Ghana and Ivory Coast, or palm oil in 
Nigeria was designed for areas relatively close to the Atlantic coast (Hart, 1979).  In 
Kenya or Southern Rhodesia, an indigenous smallholder sector were allowed to thrive on 
the edges of the settler farm economy, for which infrastructure and services had been 
developed, but was not extended to other parts of the colony.  Many of the regional 
income disparities witnessed today result from these agricultural dynamics in the first 
half of the 20th century.  
 
Colonial investments in education and health were at first mostly ignored, or designated 
as the responsibility of the Christian missions. By the 1920s, a rudimentary system of 
public provision of social policies was put in place, but its inadequacies are too well 
known to be retold here (Kilson, 1970; Cogneau, 2003).  The diffusion of services by the 
missions in the early colonial period exacerbated spatial inequalities, since the missions 
made their way inland from the coast slowly, and were less active in regions under 
indirect rule.  In West Africa, this often meant a significant difference in literacy levels at 
the time of independence between the more Christianized and administered south and the 
Muslim and indirectly ruled north.  For instance, in Nigeria, English literacy in the south 
hovered just under a fifth of the population by 1940, but was limited to 2 percent in the 
North (Kohli, p. 313).   
 
Third, instead of promoting economic development, the primary function of the colonial 
state was to enforce law and order, and in so doing, to demonstrate its own sovereignty 
over the territory.  Given their nature as  “the minimalist vehicles of alien hegemony”, in 
Young’s (1994, p. 215) felicitous phrase, colonial states were not meant to be responsive 
to citizen needs, since local populations were not viewed as full fledged citizens, but 
rather as subjects.  Given the fresh memories of pacification, the deep illegitimacy of the 
state in the eyes of Africans meant, in addition, that a primary purpose of the state 




For much of the colonial era, governments found it hard to recruit functionaries for their 
colonies, given the often lethal harshness of the tropical conditions; as a result, the 
European bureaucracy in most African colonies was both better paid and less qualified 
than its metropolitan counterparts (Crowder, 1970).  The colonial administration thus 
often recruited officials whose poor performance had limited their advancement in the 
metropole, and who were attracted by the greater degree of responsibility and 
discretionary power they were likely to enjoy in the colonies. Combined with the 
subaltern status and lack of political power of African populations, this state of affairs 
further undermined the responsiveness of states and contributed to a state culture of 
imperiousness and self-regard.  Colonial states were more corrupt (Tignor, 1993) and 
often less effective than their metropolitan counterparts.   
 
In sum, social stratification at independence resulted in no small part from these three 
dynamics. The colonial state’s policies to encourage agricultural commodity production 
proved successful, due to the very good commodity prices during and after World War II.  
But commodities like cotton or cocoa were typically farmed by a small minority of 
farmers, while the majorities of rural populations continued to live outside of the cash 
economy.  Meanwhile, cash farmer incomes were mercilessly taxed, and helped to fuel 
the significant urbanization of the 1950s, as a class of merchants, state clerks and other 
service providers rose in burgeoning cities on the coast (Freund, 2007).  At the same 
time, industrialization was slow and halting, and indigenous capitalism discouraged by 
colonial administrations that worried about the competition indigenous firms might 
represent for metropolitan industrial firms in the same sectors, and the politically 
influential colonial trading firms that controlled the trade with the colonies. Again, it is 
important to emphasize that this nearsighted and deeply conservative economic policy 
was made possible by the lack of political representation of the local population. 
 
Inequality and the Construction of the Modern African State 
Thus, African elites inherited a state at independence that was neither responsive nor 
developmental, in large part because the economic institutions of European colonialism 
had been shaped to deal with the region’s low economic potential and its failure to attract 
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European settlers.  Its tradition of harsh extractive practices and poor performance had 
been somewhat attenuated by the burst of developmental investments in the decade 
before independence, but remained ingrained in the culture of the public bureaucracy.  As 
Englebert (2009, forthcoming) nicely puts it, Africa had at independence “no historical 
process of social contracting” in which the development of the state is linked to some 
societal understanding.  The colonial state had been imposed on African populations, and 
at independence, a rapid transfer of power was effectuated to a new state elite, which 
enjoyed only a thin degree of legitimacy.   
 
The ambitions of the post World War II colonial state had been sustained by high 
commodity prices, that provided some budgetary surpluses to governments for the first 
time, and the need to prepare the colonies for independence helped legitimate budgetary 
support in the parliaments of the metropole for the first time (Cooper, 2002).  
Nonetheless, this support evaporated quickly after independence, so that aid budgets were 
almost immediately pressured downwards, while the end of the post-Korean war 
commodity boom unhappily coincided with the advent of independence.  African 
governments were thus soon faced with tightening budgets, and those with developmental 
ambitions, such as Nkrumah’s Ghana, were almost immediately bankrupt.  
 
The degree to which class formation in post-colonial Africa was intimately linked to state 
politics is one of the central themes of the Africanist political economy literature and 
need not be repeated here.  Larry Diamond (1987), Dick Sklar (1979) Jean Francois 
Bayart (1989) and others have all argued that for emerging elites in post colonial Africa, 
political power was the quickest and easiest route to economic wealth.  Colonialism had 
bequeathed a shockingly low level of trained man power; the first generation of men and 
to a lesser extent women to return to the continent with European degrees could expect 
rapid promotion within government, and typically represented a far more secure path to 
wealth than a career in the underdeveloped private sector.  Bakary (1993) shows how 
government cabinets in Cote d’Ivoire in the decade following independence were largely 




Why did the governments that emerged at independence not do more to lower inequality?  
An exhaustive analysis is well beyond the scope of this paper, which will limit itself to 
just three related points will be emphasized regarding processes of social stratification.  
First, as post-colonial states were constituted, a distinctive process of class formation 
emerged which exacerbated the patterns set by colonial administrations.  Part of the 
attractiveness of state employment was related to the nature of the colonial administration 
described above.  The relatively smooth transition to independence meant that French and 
British colonial administrations were indigenized with remarkably few changes.  Salaries 
and benefits were either kept at the same levels or were not adequately transformed to 
reflect the conditions of local labor markets.  Even though inflation was to slowly but 
surely make inroads into these salaries, one result was that public sector wages were 
considerably higher relative to wages in the rest of the economy than in OECD countries 
(Lindauer and Nunberg, 1994).  Working for the government, in other words, brought on 
a substantial premium.  This occasioned enormous pressure on governments to increase 
the number of positions within the bureaucracy, which in any event also had a political 
logic for governments seeking to increase their popularity, particularly once economic 
growth began to fail.  Again, the rapid growth of the bureaucracy, which commonly more 
than tripled in size in the first decade of independence is well documented (Lindauer and 
Nunberg, 1994).  
 
The segments of the population that were most likely to benefit from this system were 
often regions and groups that had benefited the most from the colonial era. Thus, in West 
Africa, the state after independence tended to be predominantly peopled by ethnic groups 
that had been close to the coast or capital city.  These groups had typically enjoyed closer 
and longer contacts to the colonial authorities.  In countries like Nigeria, the 
predominantly Muslim hinterland that had typically benefited much less from the 
mission-dominated colonial education systems were less likely to have received the first 
scholarships to go study in Europe.  Groups in the hinterland suffered from a legacy of 
poor infrastructure and communications.  Initial advantages were reinforced over time, 
exacerbating the regional differences that are so striking today.   
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The expense of maintaining a relatively privileged administration has constituted an 
important opportunity cost for these states, given their low level of resources.  I have 
documented elsewhere (van de Walle, 2001), the extraordinary cost of the sovereignty 
expense of the African state, with its large government cabinets, ambitious diplomatic 
services and various perks of service.  Most comparative statistics suggest that African 
state expenditures have remained relatively small – here again fiscal difficulties have 
been apparent – but that the share of these expenditures going to recurrent government 
consumption have been unusually large.  The cost in poor countries can be substantial, in 
foregone poverty reduction programs and the neglect of poorer hinterland regions. 
 
Second, levels of state performance did not improve, following independence, but were 
characterized by the low standards, traditions of non-responsiveness and non-
developmental nature of the state apparatus being inherited. A recent account of public 
sector practices in West Africa (Blundo and Olivier de Sardan, 2006) suggests just how 
poor service delivery has continued to be for average citizens in the region.  Initially, 
rapid Africanization of the civil service undermined capacity in many countries, as 
experienced colonial administrators were replaced.  The colonial state’s historic lack of 
accountability was abetted by the quick break down of democracy after independence and 
the emergence of authoritarian systems that both repressed participation and politicized 
the civil service, manipulating state resources in a clientelistic fashion to maintain 
political stability.  Of course, the degree of corruption varies across time and place, and it 
would hardly be accurate to suggest that all state officials have been corrupt, but the 
literature suggests the extent to which the 1960s and 1970s were characterized by the 
personal enrichment of state officials and the use of political power to gain economic 
power (van de Walle, 2001). 
 
A number of scholars (Schatzberg, 2001; Chabal and Daloz, 1999) advance what might 
be called a redistributive theory of political clientelism and corruption in Africa.  In other 
words, they appear to believe that in low-income states, clientelistic practices can have a 
positive effect on income distribution.  The argument goes that the corruption of political 
elites actually is recirculated into the economy through the favors, gifts and services that 
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these ‘big men’ provide to their kin and ethnic communities.  That is indeed a mostly 
implicit legitimating claim of clientelism, that in low income environments characterized 
by considerably uncertainty and a weak state, the poor rely on the favors of the rich and 
powerful to survive.  It is very hard to test such claims empirically.  The argument of this 
paper, based in part on the reality of the high levels of inequality that the region does 
exhibit, is that clientelism can not be redistributive.  More precisely, the networks in 
which politically mediated financial gains are redistributed are extremely narrow and do 
not extend down the social pyramid.  The big man redistributes to his immediate kin, but 
not to the poor within his broader lineage or ethnic group.  For them, the gains of 
clientelism are mostly symbolic, though it may well be the case that patron-client links 
serve as an occasional insurance mechanism for the poor.  In sum and baldly stated, state 
corruption in the region has been a mechanism for asset accumulation and elite formation 
rather than poverty alleviation and income redistribution. 
 
The third reason for which post colonial governments failed to alter older patterns of 
inequality relate to the policies they have pursued, itself the result of the political 
dynamics just described.  In their policies and investments, post colonial governmental 
commitments to equitable development have been uneven at best.  True, the progressive 
developmental ideology promoted by most post-colonial African governments 
dramatically enlarged the state’s core mission, despite not improving its performance or 
responsiveness.  Even as the state bureaucracy increasingly combined the faults of 
colonial administration with an enhanced venality and chaotic growth, it also 
enthusiastically adopted most donor fashions, from promoting women’s rights to 
protecting the environment.  True, also, the post colonial state has received substantial 
amounts of foreign aid by donors, who have thus had a real impact on development 
policies on the continent, some of which have been genuinely redistributive. Nonetheless, 
the failure of most post-colonial governments to overturn the patterns of inequality they 
inherited has much to do with the content of the policies effectively implemented over the 




It is striking, for instance, how little governments have managed to alter the patterns of 
regional disparity described above that had developed during the colonial era.  Few 
countries successfully diversified away from the small number of export commodities 
developed in the colonial era that tended to be at the root of these disparities.  Thus, Mali 
and Burkina Faso remain dependent on their cotton exports, the monoculture established 
by the French colonial administration that to this day benefit only a small minority of 
rural households, while Rwanda and Burundi remain dependent on coffee exports, and 
Zambia has relied on copper exports for most of its history.  Indeed, regional disparities 
have worsened in some cases, as in Nigeria, where the increasing role of oil, now 
accounting for over 90 percent of exports, has actually resulted in the decline of exports 
for such agricultural commodities as cocoa or cotton that had once enriched specific non-
oil regions.  
 
The public policies adopted by governments since independence have in some cases 
exacerbated the process of social stratification.  The tone was set in many countries in the 
decade after independence when governments used the rhetoric of socialism and 
nationalism to transfer significant assets belonging to foreigners to the political class (see 
Rood, 1976).  In some countries, indigenization policies had legitimate public policy 
objectives, even if their long term impact on private sector investment typically proved 
disastrous, but their implementation was almost invariably politicized and represented a 
key step in the process of “straddling processes,” in which top political families also 
came to be prominent families in the world of commerce and industry.  Much the same 
can be said about the redistribution of settler lands in countries like Kenya and Zimbabwe 
(Jenkins, 1997), in which nationalist and progressive rhetoric during the early post-
colonial era disguised the appropriation of the best lands by a remarkably circumscribed 
number of members of the political elite, so that the land reforms pursued did not actually 
result in a less unequal distribution of land assets. 
 
In the more industrialized regions of the developing world, the state provided tangible 
support to the manufacturing sector under the rubric of ISI industrialization during the 
1950s and 1960s (Kohli, 2004; Waterbury, 1999) with policies that nurtured and 
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sustained an urban working and middle class, potentially mitigating inequality.  In Africa, 
where the industrial sector was small and closely linked to commercial interests linked to 
the colonial metropole (Swainson, 1980) trade policy was never really integrated within a 
viable industrial strategy, but was instead mostly motivated by the rent-seeking it made 
possible (Bienen, 1990).  Not uncommonly, state agents undermined official trade 
policies with large scale smuggling and the systematic selling of import licenses (Hibou, 
1996).  In general, and with some notable exceptions, the trade and exchange rate policies 
that might have had a positive effect on income distribution primarily served to enrich a 
small elite and promote the consumption patterns that exacerbated urban bias tendencies. 
 
Other policies have had a less overt but no less real impact on social stratification.  Thus, 
one of the hallmarks of African policy making in the post-colonial era has been the extent 
to which social policies are woefully underfunded relative to other government 
expenditures, notably military expenditures, as shown in Table 3.  
 
Table 3: Public Expenditures in Sub-Saharan Africa, late 1990s 
 
PUBLIC EXPENDITURES IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA, 
late 1990s 
 (as a % of GNP)   
      
  Health  Education Military   
      
SSA Average  1.98 4.18 3.32  
      
Minimum  Nigeria Nigeria Ghana  
  0.2 0.7 0.7  
      
Maximum  Angola Namibia Angola  
  3.9 9.1 20.5  
      
(source: Addison, 2001)    
 
 
It is hard to know for sure, given the often inflated nature of social indicators, and there is 
clearly enormous variation across states in the region (see below), but the continuing 
failure to reach universal primary education in much of west and central Africa, or the 
absolutely dismal nature of health services provision in much of the continent is striking.  
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In their survey of education outcomes in developing countries, Glewwe and Kremer 
(2006) show that African countries have consistently underperformed both other regions 
and even low-income countries in other regions for outcomes such as enrollment rates, 
average age of schooling and so on.   The persistence of low human capital has been a 
consequence of low social spending, which in turn probably helps account for the low 
levels of FDI, which might have served to promote more widely distributed economic 
growth.  
 
A number of studies of social policies in Africa (eg Castro-Leal et. al., 1999) have, 
moreover, argued that education and health expenditures have not always served the 
needs of the poor, and may actually have been regressive in their economic effects. This 
results from the well known biases of social service delivery in the region; social services 
tend to favor urban areas over the poorer rural areas. The capital city receives the lion’s 
share, while hinterland areas far from the capital systematically receive a lower standard 
of service.  Health services favor curative, hospital services that tend to cater to the rich, 
over preventative health care, which would be more likely to help the poor, including the 
urban poor which often are unable to access to medical services for economic reasons 
(Magadi et al. 2003).  The per-student expenditures of education policies have 
overwhelmingly favored secondary and tertiary education over primary education, again 
with likely regressive effects in countries in which only a small minority of students, 
typically from privileged backgrounds, go beyond primary schools.    
 
Government tax policies probably also have regressive effects on income distribution.  
Tax systems have been narrowly based and too reliant on trade and sales taxes.  In the 
first two decades of independence, tax policies exhibited striking urban bias, as states 
taxed agricultural production in order to finance the state’s expansion and parastatal 
industrial and agro-industrial schemes, with often devastating impact on rural incomes 
(Bates, 1981).  It was not unusual, for governmental marketing boards to pass on less 
than 25 percent of the world price of cocoa, coffee or cotton to farmers.  Since the 
incidence of poverty is typically greater in the country side, such tax policies had 
regressive impact, as well as deeply negative impacts for economic growth.  
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In addition, the implementation of tax policies, with enormous leakages and fraud, 
typically enhanced the regressive nature of the systems.  In general, policies are more 
regressive after implementation, than on paper.  One reason is the excessive reliance on 
supplementary budgets during the course of the fiscal year in many countries, as they 
invariably are directed at defense expenditures or presidential discretionary programs that 
are not likely to be progressive.  Economists and the public policy literature often treat 
the regressive nature of public policy as exogenous to the politics of the country.  These 
are viewed as ‘lapses’ of good public policy, largely due to breakdowns in 
implementation.  In part, this public policy view is warranted, in countries in which state 
capacity is low.  Nonetheless, the consistent failure of public expenditures in most 
African countries to have a progressive impact on income and asset distribution is better 
understood as endogenous to the process of state formation and class stratification in 
these countries.  
 
Cross National Variation 
This paper has focused on the modal patterns observed across Africa. This section briefly 
nuances the argument by describing some exceptions to and variation within these 
patterns.  A first exception to introduce is the slightly different logic within the settler 
economies of southern Africa.  Based on a global data set, Angeles (2007) argues that 
colonialism increased inequality only when European settlers constituted a significant yet 
minority proportion of the overall population in the colony.  Thus, he argues, levels of 
inequality was lower in colonies such as New Zealand or Australia, in which European 
settlers were a significant majority of the population, as well as in colonies, such as many 
of those in Africa, where there were essentially no settler population.  Instead, inequality 
was highest when settlers represented a privileged minority.  In Africa, this accords with 
what we know of a small number of settler colonies in southern Africa, in which colonial 
authorities acted on behalf of the economic interests of a sizeable minority of white 
settlers.   
 
By itself, the Africa data in part buttresses Angeles’ claim, since the levels of inequality 
in the settler colonies are consistently above regional averages. On the other hand, since 
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among the countries without settlers there remain a number of high inequality countries, 
the Angeles model clearly only explains a part of the variation observed in the region.  It 
seems likely that the dynamics of inequality in the settler colonies of southern Africa may 
be somewhat different than the ones discussed here.  For instance, I suspect that South 
Africa follows patterns much more similar to those described above for Latin America, 
with substantial European immigration and a much earlier pattern of colonization.  In 
other words, though the ex-settler colonies also have high levels of inequality, it may well 
be for other reasons.  Why is inequality then not even higher in these states?  It can be 
hypothesized that settlers created a racist state, but one that was more competent and 
more responsive to societal needs, largely because of the political power of the settlers, 
on whose behalf the state wanted to promote economic development, albeit an 
exclusionary version.  The racial inequality promoted by the apartheid state was thus 
attenuated by the different dynamic of state formation in countries in which a substantial 
minority of the population was empowered and civil society was allowed to flower, 
particularly after the onset of black majority rule.  What had been white settler 
institutions became mechanisms of vertical accountability in the new regimes.  It is thus 
suggestive that white settler Southern Rhodesia (to become Zimbabwe) had the highest 
proportion of school age children in school, 96 % in 1960 compared to a continental 
average of 36% (Fieldhouse, 1986).  
 
For the rest of the Africa region, at least three factors can be hypothesized to account for 
the variation in inequality levels, and can be sketched out here, in lieu of a more in depth 
treatment.  First, the level of democracy in the system since independence shapes how 
responsive governments are to societal pressures. This paper has argued that colonialism 
left a legacy of non-democratic and thus non-responsive state structures.  Nonetheless, 
countries do increasingly vary in their levels of democracy, and it may be hypothesized 
that in countries in which governments have been less repressive and mechanisms of 
participation and political competition were allowed to develop following independence, 
inequality has been somewhat attenuated.  Indeed, if this is the case, the democratization 
in the region since the early 1990s may herald a progressive improvement in the level of 
inequality.  Stasavage (2005) argues that as quickly as a decade after the introduction of 
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regular elections in the region, spending on social services has improved.  I am skeptical 
that the effects of democratization are likely to be felt in such a brief time, but it seems 
plausible that they will emerge in the fullness of time.  
 
Second, variations in the composition of ethnicity appears to be a salient factor. 
Milanovic (2003) finds a positive correlation between the number of distinct ethnic 
groups in a country and social inequality (Milanovic, 2003). For a smaller set of 11 
countries, mostly in West Africa, Brockerhoff and Hewett (2000) similarly find striking 
differences in child mortality across ethnic groups, with some groups suffering from 
mortality rates more than twice rates prevailing within other groups.  Ethnicity often 
correlates well with region, and it is unfortunate that they do not attempt to account for 
regional variation in mortality rates.   
 
I hypothesize that the salience of ethnicity relates to the greater likelihood that the ethnic 
groups that dominate the state apparatus are less likely to redistribute state income in 
countries in which there is a higher level of ethnic heterogeneity.  Ethnic divisions have 
also been associated with greater violence, and there is some evidence that violence has 
exacerbated inequality in the region. For instance, Addison and Ndikumana (2001) have 
suggested that African countries that are either currently in conflict, or recently coming 
out of conflict tend to devote a larger share of their expenditures to military and security 
matters, and a commensurately lower amount on social and anti-poverty expenditures.  
For similar reasons, ethnic heterogeneity is also associated with lower levels of 
democracy, which may reinforce the tendency of ethnically heterogeneous states to 
underinvest in poverty reduction.   
 
Third, the presence of mineral and oil commodity wealth worsens the distribution of 
income, everything being equal.  Here, the mechanism is that capital intensive 
productions controlled by the state benefit fewer economic agents.  In addition, mineral 
and oil wealth is typically geographically concentrated, and their benefits are less likely 
to diffuse across a broad part of the national territory. When the state uses this wealth to 
promote government consumption rather than productive investment, the result is a 
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greater and faster increase in inequality.   The state could in fact use the mineral or oil 
resources to combat poverty promote economic development, as Botswana appears to 
have done, for instance (Acemoglu et al, 2003).  Most states have instead used these 
resources for non-developmental purposes.   No income distribution data appears to be 
available on Angola, for instance, but the combination of conflict, ethnic heterogeneity 
and oil would together suggest a very high level of income inequality.  
 
Concluding Remarks 
I have argued that the surprisingly high levels of inequality in Africa can be understood 
as part and parcel of a process of class formation linked to processes of state building that 
have their origins in the economic institutions of the early colonial state.  The original 
natural conditions faced by European colonialists in Africa in the 19th century shaped the 
political and economic institutions they established in the region.  The resulting colonial 
state institutions were not accountable or responsive to African populations, and were as 
a result less likely to improve the welfare of the majority of the population.  In addition, 
the limited nature of African colonialism, due in large part to fiscal exigencies, created 
the conditions for the emergence of substantial spatial inequalities, which persist to this 
day.  Colonialism favored in relative terms certain indigenous groups, which often 
inherited the state at independence.  Insofar as political power has often been used to gain 
economic advantages during the post-colonial era, inequality has little changed over the 
course of the last forty years, despite the official focus on development and poverty 
alleviation by donors and governments alike.  In sum, much of the post-colonial era has 
witnessed the consolidation of these initial advantages.  The recent democratization of the 
region’s politics, however imperfect, provides a salutary opportunity to change these 
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